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    Introduction and Background 
 In order to ensure secure communications, known information must be shared among 
both communicating parties. This piece of information, called a cryptographic key, allows the 
sending party to successfully encrypt, and the receiving party to successfully decrypt the 
transmitted information. However, because both parties must have possession of this same key in 
order to successfully communicate, cryptographers throughout history have struggled with 
finding a method to transmit this key from the sending to the receiving party without it being 
intercepted along the way. For a time, until the advent of electronic cryptography, keys had to be 
distributed in person, via mail or by courier, as these were the only relatively secure methods for 
sending information from one person to another. Later in the computer age, however, computer 
scientists and cryptographers alike worked to devise schemes to successfully and securely 
transmit key material over insecure channels. As a result, there today exist solutions to the Key 
Distribution Problem for both symmetric, as well as public key cryptosystems.  
            On the symmetric side, the two most promising solutions are to either use a Key 
Derivation Function or a Key Wrapping scheme. Both of these methods provide a secure means 
for a symmetric cryptographic key to be transmitted from sender to receiver without the threat of 
outside intrusion. With public key systems, both Merkle’s Puzzles and the Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange are viable, efficient solutions. While these methods differ by the type of cryptosystem 
in which they are employed, there also exists disparity in their respective methods of action. 
Both methods used in symmetric systems, Key Derivation Functions and Key Wrapping, are 
protocols which directly transmit the key material. In other words, it is the key itself (though 
successfully shielded) that is being sent over the insecure channel. Conversely, both protocols 
used in public key systems are key agreement protocols. With these schemes, trivial information 
is sent over the insecure channel, and this information is used by both parties to construct the 
same shared key governed by a predetermined set of rules. With all four of these protocols, 
cryptographic keys are able to be successfully and securely transmitted from one party to 
another. Trouble lies ahead, though, when considering the future of computing and its effect on 
the cryptographic landscape. 
            Quantum computing is the future. In fact, today, multiple companies such as Google and 
IBM already have working quantum computers which are able to complete tasks at speeds 
exponentially faster than their classical computer counterparts. When quantum computing 
becomes a reality, all cryptographic key distribution as well as encryption/decryption protocols 
will be rendered null and void. This is because quantum computers are able to withstand an 
exponentially larger computational load than common classical computers. Because of this, they 
would be easily able to break all current encryption/decryption and key distribution. Due to this 
conundrum, many “quantum safe” cryptographic algorithms have been developed, in which the 
computational effort required to break these ciphers is too great even for a quantum computer to 
realistically solve. The Key Distribution Problem carries over to the quantum space as well, and 
as such various “quantum safe” key distribution protocols have been developed as well, such as 
the well-known BB84 protocol. The work being done now to create standards of cryptography 
that can remain in a quantum future will ensure that people’s data and privacy remain 
safeguarded for the years to come. 
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   Key Distribution in Symmetric Cryptosystems 
  
            For the majority of the history of cryptography, symmetric ciphers were the gold standard 
for secure communication. Until the advent of more advanced computing technology beginning 
in the late 1930s, manual, symmetric ciphers were for the most part, the only type of encryption 
system that had been developed and was the only one which was widely used. Looking at these 
ciphers through a lens of the Key Distribution Problem, just as the ciphers themselves were 
manual, so were key distribution solutions. These included physically transporting the key, either 
over mail, by in person meeting or via courier, to the desired recipient of the future message. It 
was not until computerized encryption algorithms were created (such as DES) that solutions for 
distributing keys over networks, instead of over physical distances were needed. As such, 
multiple protocols for key distribution in symmetric cryptosystems were devised. 
 
Key Derivation Functions 
  
            The first solution to the Key Distribution Problem for symmetric cryptosystems is the use 
of a Key Derivation Function. A Key Derivation Function is a mathematical function which 
takes a fixed input and produces an output which is used by both the sender and receiver as the 
encryption/decryption key (Sönmez, 2009). The information that is transmitted over the insecure 
channel is called the Key Derivation Key and is consists of a random string of bits. The sender 
will transmit this Key Derivation Key to the receiver. Both parties will then use the Key 
Derivation Key as the input to the agreed upon Key Derivation Function, and the result will be 
used as the encryption/decryption key. 
            Mathematical operations called pseudorandom functions are used to generate the key 
material (Sönmez, 2009). These functions are designed to behave as close to random as possible, 
since it is surprisingly difficult to successfully mathematically model random behavior. The 
random behavior of these functions is critical in a scheme like this, as it ensures that the creation 
of the key is one-way. That is, it would be extremely difficult for an adversary to construct the 
correct key following recovery of the Key Derivation Key. This is due to the relative random 
behavior of strong Key Derivation Functions. The more random the function behaves, the more 
difficult it is for an adversary to reconstruct the key from intercepted material.  
            When considering the security of a Key Derivation Function, it is also important to look 
at the length of the Key Derivation Key being used. This depends on the pseudorandom function 
being used in the specific key derivation. The two main pseudorandom functions used in most 
key derivations, Hash Message Authenticated Code (HMAC) and Cipher Message Authenticated 
Code (CMAC), require different key lengths to ensure a secure key derivation (Sönmez, 2009). 
When using an HMAC function, the Key Derivation Key is allowed to be any length (Sönmez, 
2009). On the other hand, when using CMAC as the pseudorandom function, the length of the 
Key Derivation Key is determined by the length of the blocks being used in the CMAC, which is 
itself a form of block cipher (Sönmez, 2009). 
            The security of a Key Derivation Function also depends on the strength of the 
pseudorandom function being used. In this case, the strength of the pseudorandom function is 
defined as the amount of effort it would take an adversary to correctly map a random input string 
of bits to the correct output string, in other words, the key (Chen, 2008). Therefore, the greater 
the amount of work it would take an adversary to recover correct output material, the greater 
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strength the pseudorandom function has. The strength, and by proxy the required effort, are most 
likely dependent on how random the function being used behaves. The more a function trends 
towards truly random behavior, the more work it would take someone to reverse the process, as it 
is much more difficult to detect and exploit patters when the behavior of the data becomes more 
and more random. 
            A final defining feature of Key Derivation Functions is their ability to be used to create a 
key hierarchy. This is where key material derived through the use of a Key Derivation function is 
fed back into the same function, resulting in more keys (Sönmez, 2009). This process can be 
repeated as many times as desired. This feature of Key Derivation Functions is important when 
considering the efficiency of a symmetric cryptosystem. Given that each communication needs 
to be encrypted/decrypted using a unique shared key, being able to create many keys from one 
original would be much more efficient than using redoing the original process over multiple 
times. When considering a system in which many unique keys are used, such as modules 
encrypted using DES, having many keys available at once as opposed to creating a new key each 
time one is needed is certainly more efficient.  
 
Key Wrapping 
             
            Key Wrapping is another successful, secure scheme for distributing symmetric 
cryptographic keys. Key Wrapping is the practice of encrypting key material itself, and then 
transmitting the encrypted key over the insecure channel to the desired recipient (Gennaro, 
2009). Key Wrapping differs from using a Key Derivation Function in the sense that it is the key 
itself, though encrypted, that is being sent over the insecure channel, whereas with a Key 
Derivation Function it is trivial information that is sent to later construct the key. 
            A secure key wrapping scheme is executed following a method called Hash-then-Encrypt 
(Gennaro, 2009). This is when key material is first fed into a hash function, and the output is 
symmetrically encrypted (Gennaro, 2009).iEncryption of the key itself is commonly done using 
the AES protocol. In a scenario like this, the original key will be hashed into blocks of 64 bits, 
and each block of 64 bits will be encrypted according to the AES protocol (Sönmez, 2009).  
            Given that key wrapping is typically a process involving AES, it is important to also 
consider how the properties of AES itself will affect the security and efficacy of the key wrap. 
The first property to consider is the size of the key itself that is getting wrapped. Generally, it is 
believed that the longer the key is, the more secure the key wrap will be overall (Sönmez, 2009). 
The reasoning behind this is simple; the longer the message being encrypted is (the message 
being encrypted in this case is the key) the more difficult it is for an adversary to decrypt it. This, 
once again, becomes a problem of effort. Similar to Key Derivation Functions, where the 
inherent security was the amount of effort it would take to solve the problem, much of the 
security of a key wrap lies on the same principle. A key wrap is simply a symmetric cipher 
whose contents happen to hold critical significance. As such, its security is no different than the 
security of any other symmetric cipher and relies heavily on the length and complexity of the 
message being encrypted.  
 
   Key Distribution in Public Key Cryptosystems 
             
            Public Key Cryptography holds special significance in the context of the Key 
Distribution Problem. Public Key Cryptography is, itself, a solution to the Key Distribution 
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Problem found in symmetric cryptosystems. Public Key Cryptography is based off the principle 
of there being two keys used in the scheme: the public key, used by the sender to encrypt the 
message and the private key, used by the recipient to decrypt the message. However, issues with 
key distribution still do exist. For example, for someone wishing to send someone else an 
encrypted message through a public key system, the sender needs to have the public key of the 
recipient in order to encrypt the message. While it will not corrupt the integrity of the system to 
have the public key sent over the insecure channel, it may be of good conscious for the sender to 
securely distribute his public key anyway. For this there are solutions. 
 
Merkle’s Puzzles 
             
            Ralph Merkle is a computer scientist who is credited as one of the inventors of public key 
cryptography. He, along with fellow computer scientists Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman 
invented the field in 1976, after months of pondering over how to create a cryptosystem in which 
key exchange became unnecessary (Singh, 1999). In doing so, they realized that a successful 
public key system is reliant on a strong method of secure key exchange. In preliminary work on 
the matter, Merkle devised a scheme in which two parties could exchange a key by means of a 
set of cryptographic puzzles, which were “cryptogram[s] which [are] meant to be broken” 
(Merkle, 1978, p. 296). These later became known as Merkle’s Puzzles and formed the basis for 
public key cryptography. 
            To execute a key exchange through the use of Merkle’s Puzzles, the sender would first 
encrypt a set of short plaintext hashes via any type of encryption scheme he desires. Most times, 
this is a simple symmetric cipher.  The number of puzzles encrypted is agreed upon by the sender 
and recipient (Merkle, 1978). Each puzzle is made up of two pieces. The first is a number unique 
to each puzzle that is called the ID number and is used to identify each puzzle in the set. The 
second is the puzzle key, and is the key associated with the chosen puzzle (Merkle, 1978). 
Having received the entire set of puzzles, the recipient will choose one at random and decrypt it. 
He will then receive the ID number from the decrypted puzzle and send it to the sender over the 
insecure channel. With the sender having the ID number, he can recover the puzzle from which it 
is from. The puzzle key from the chosen puzzle is used as the encryption key for further secure 
communication.  
            Security in Merkle’s Puzzles appears in two places. The first is with the size of the key 
used to encrypt the puzzles initially. As with many cryptographic schemes, security is dependent 
on the effort it would take someone to break the scheme. This is the same for Merkle’s Puzzles. 
The puzzles can be encrypted with a key of any length, and as such a longer key would require a 
greater amount of effort to solve the cipher by brute force (Merkle, 1978). Therefore, security of 
the puzzles is firstly defined by the length of the key used to encrypt them. The second aspect of 
security appears in the number of puzzles chosen to be used in the scheme. Once again, this is a 
problem of effort. The more puzzles used in the set, the longer it would take an adversary to 
decrypt enough of them until reaching the correct puzzle and key. Therefore, the greater the 
number of puzzles used in the set, the more secure the scheme becomes as a whole.  
            Merkle’s Puzzles are an early, and relatively simplified example of one of the key facets 
of public key cryptography: one-way functions. Computer scientist Subhash Kak describes 
Merkle’s Puzzles as being “equivalent to the dictionary method of one-way function generation” 
(Kak, 1984, p. 106). Put simply, a one-way function is a function which can be computed easily 
one way but is difficult to solve in the other direction. These form the basis of public key 
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cryptography. Kak is referencing a scenario in which party A creates two dictionaries of 
languages X and Y (Kak, 1984). Party A then transmits dictionary X to party B, who selects an 
entry at random, comprising the chosen word in both language X and language Y (Kak, 1984). 
Party B then sends the element in language Y from the chosen entry back to Party A, who finds 
that word in the dictionary for language Y, using the corresponding word in language X as the 
encryption/decryption key (Kak, 1984).  
            This scheme invented by Merkle opened the door for research and development into 
public key cryptography, some even close to home. Two of Merkle’s colleagues, Whitfield 
Diffie and Martin Hellman expanded upon the principles of Merkle’s Puzzles and created a 
second, more comprehensive form of key agreement. 
 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
  
            Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman are computer scientists and cryptographers who 
worked with Ralph Merkle during the infancy of public key cryptography. In 1976, following 
months of work on the matter, Diffie and Hellman created a key distribution protocol that 
expanded on the principles laid out in Merkle’s Puzzles, specifically the use of one-way 
functions (Holden, 2017). The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is grounded in what has aptly been 
named the Diffie-Hellman Problem, a concept similar in nature to the discrete logarithm 
problem. Its security derives from this key question: Given two values aXi mod q and aXj mod q, 
compute aXiXj mod q. This problem, while seemingly simple at first glance, is actually 
extremely difficult and nearly impossible for a human to realistically solve, especially when 
values of p are extremely large.  
            The protocol is conducted as follows. First, both parties participating in the scheme (i & 
j) must decide on a large prime number q (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). Today, it is recommended 
for this prime to be at least 600 digits long in order to ensure proper security (Holden, 2017). 
This is because, as in the problem described above, the larger the q value is, the more difficult 
the problem will be due to the added effort needed to deal with a number that large. Second, both 
parties need to find a second number a, which is a primitive root of q (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). 
This number becomes important during the final computation. It is important to note that both 
these numbers can be sent over an insecure channel with no consequence, as they themselves 
hold no relation or resemblance to the key. Next, each party chooses a random number Xiand Xj 
respectively, where Xi  (1, q – 1) and Xj  (1, q – 1) (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). It is critical to 
the integrity of the scheme that both Xi and Xj remain secret. Using these values, each party then 
constructs a new number Y according to the following rule: Yi = aXi mod q and Yj = aXj mod q 
(Diffie & Hellman, 1976). It is these two values which will be transmitted over the insecure 
channel, with Yi sent to party j and Yj sent to party i. Now, each party takes the value Y received 
from the other and raises that value to the power of their respective X value. Doing so yields the 
following result for party i: (Yi)Xj = (aXi)Xj = Kij. And for party j: (Yj)Xi = (aXj)Xi = Kij (Diffie 
& Hellman, 1976). If done correctly, they produce the same result which is used as the key.   
            In creating their protocol, Diffie and Hellman exploited some of the key principles used 
in Merkle’s Puzzles. Firstly, both protocols only send information trivial in relation to the key 
itself over the insecure channel. In the case of this scheme, that information is the original prime 
q, the primitive root a, and the composed values Y. None of these four values contain the 
encryption/decryption key and as such all of them are safe to be transmitted over the insecure 
channel. This is what makes Diffie-Hellman (and Merkle’s Puzzles for that matter) unique when 
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considering the scope of key distribution. Instead of sending the actual key in some secure 
fashion, what is being sent are components, or building blocks of the key. What makes these 
components themselves secure is the Diffie-Hellman Problem to which they adhere. This, on top 
of the fact that the information being transmitted simply is not the key is what makes Diffie-
Hellman secure, and is what started the migration to public key cryptography. 
 
    Quantum Key Distribution 
  
            Today in 2020, recent developments in computing technology have cemented the fact 
that quantum computing is a reality and is going to become commonplace sooner rather than 
later. The caveat with this fact, though, is that once quantum computing becomes normal, all 
cryptographic algorithms created to date will be rendered obsolete due to the sheer 
computational power of these new machines. Therefore, various new “quantum proof” 
cryptographic and key distribution protocols have been developed to date. These protocols 




            Quantum mechanics is defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica as “the science dealing 
with the behavior of matter and light on the atomic and subatomic scale" (Squires, 2020). Most 
commonly, this study is focused on the investigation of the behavior of photons--elementary 
light particles-- and electrons. Much of the quantum mechanics employed in Quantum Key 
Distribution protocols revolves around the quantum state of a particle.  
            Quantum states are an integral aspect to quantum mechanics as a whole and exist due to 
one of the foundational laws of quantum mechanics—superposition. Superposition states that a 
quantum particle can exist as a linear combination of states before being measured (Holton, 
2020). At measurement, the particle will collapse into a single one of these states bounded by the 
probability of measuring each state given its initial superposition (Holton, 2020). Therefore, the 
quantum state of a particle is the set of the probabilities of measuring each possible outcome. 
The quantum state of a particle can also be represented by a wave function. This is a function 
which represents the full quantum state of a particle at any given point in time (Tamvakis, 2019). 
It’s the combination of superposition and quantum states that is used in Quantum Key 
Distribution protocols. 
            Quantum Key Distribution harnesses the superposition property of quantum particles to 
transmit key information over an insecure channel. It’s important to note that these protocols 
have been distinguished into three categories: discrete-variable, continuous-variable, and 
distributed-phase-reference (Scarani, 2009). What makes these categories each unique is how the 
quantum particles are measured. In discrete-variable and continuous-variable protocols, 
measurement of the particles (which in this case are photons) occurs following the transmission 
of the particles. Distributed-phase-reference protocols employ a technique called homodyne 
detection, which measures the particles via the frequency of their wave function (Scarani, 2009). 
Though the different Quantum Key Distribution protocols do vary in their methods of action, 
they attempt to complete the same task. As an example of how these protocols work to ensure 
security, I will describe the first Quantum Key Distribution protocol, BB84, invented by Charles 
Bennett and Gilles Brassard. 
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The BB84 Protocol 
  
            The BB84 Protocol relies on the use of photons and their quantum properties to encode 
and send key information across an insecure channel. The scheme begins when the sender party 
chooses a random string of bits which will be used as the key. The sender then encodes each bit 
onto a photon. This is done via the photon’s polarization, or the direction it spins. For each bit, 
the sender will choose one of two methods for encoding the bit at random. The first is called the 
rectilinear basis, where a bit of zero is encoded as |0⟩,meaning a horizontal polarization, and a 
bit of one is encoded as |1⟩,a vertical polarization (Chong, 2009).ii The second is the diagonal 
basis, where zero is encoded as |+⟩, a diagonal spin in one direction, and one is encoded as |−⟩, 
a diagonal spin in the opposite direction, orthogonal to the other photon (Chong, 2009).   
            Just as each photon had to be encoded according to either the rectilinear or diagonal 
basis, the same principle exists at measurement. Measurement is done using a photon filter, 
either vertical/horizontal or diagonal, as determined by the receiver. If the encoding basis and the 
decoding basis for a given bit are the same, the measurement will be successful. This is because 
it is possible to distinguish between two orthogonal states, which in this case are the photon itself 
and the filter it’s being measured with (Van Assche, 2006). However, if the encoding and 
decoding bases differ, the measurement will fail, and the photon will collapse into either a zero 
or a one (in whatever base the photon was encoded in) (Van Assche, 2006).  
              Following the transmission and measurement of all the encoded photons, the sender will 
tell the recipient the base he used to encode each bit and corresponding photon. Bits that were 
encoded and decoded using different bases will be discarded, and only bits encoded and decoded 
with identical bases will be kept (Van Assche, 2006). This process, known as sifting, is used to 
determine which bits were correctly measured without revealing the actual bits themselves. The 
remaining bits available following the sifting process are then used as the encryption/decryption 
key for further communication. 
            A defining feature of the BB84 Protocol is the ability of the communicating parties to 
detect intrusion into the scheme by a third party. Were there to be an intruder attempting to 
intercept transmitted key material, they would have to measure the photons just as the receiver 
did. As such, the intruder will also have to choose a base to measure the photon on at random. 
Given this forced guesswork, it is safe to assume that the intruder will guess the correct base 
around 50% of the time, not jeopardizing the measurement (Haitjema, 2007). However, the other 
50% of the time he will use the incorrect base. As such, the photon will collapse into either zero 
or one at random, and the correct encoded information is lost. This is guaranteed by 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (Haitjema, 2007).iii Following the transmission, the sender 
and receiver will compare actual measured bit values of bits measured with the same base. If 
multiple errors are found, the presence of an intruder is very likely. 
 
     Looking to the Future 
  
            The Key Distribution Problem is an issue that has been worked on continuously for many 
years. Unlike many issues faced in science, it’s one which requires different solutions depending 
on the context of the problem as a whole. It was evhen directly responsible for the creation of an 
entirely new field of study in cryptography--public key cryptography--which opened the doors 
for safe and secure communication over long distances.  
            It’s also important to acknowledge that the problem is not yet over. While we have 
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created contingency plans for solving this problem in the future, i.e., the Quantum Key 
Distribution protocols, people today do not yet know how prevalent quantum computing 
technology will become. As such, the technology could easily grow, change, or evolve to a point 
that even our current “quantum-safe” protocols will be of no use. But today, we have the 
problem solved.  
            This problem is also significant to the daily lives of any electronically connected human. 
Nowadays, seemingly everyone has some sort of personal data kept online, whether it be bank 
account information, medical history, or a myriad of other important personal data. Regardless, it 
is important that these critical forms of information remain secure while also being able to 
harness the full capacity of our computer networks and be sent from site to site as necessary. 
Therefore, much of the integrity of our personal data online relies on successful key distribution 
protocols, which ensure that our information is secure and uncompromisable when it is in transit. 
            Truly, it is not yet entirely known what role key distribution will play in the future of 
computing. But, using the past as any example, it is most likely a critical role. As such, it is 
important that this problem continue to be researched, worked on, and new solutions created, so 
that when the next leap in computing technology comes to light, data and privacy will not have 
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i A cryptographic hash function is a function which takes a data set of arbitrary size and maps the 
data to another set of another fixed size. 
ii The notation used is called Dirac or bra-ket notation and is used in quantum mechanics to 
represent a quantum state. 
 
iii Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle states that “in a quantum system only one property of a pair of 
conjugate properties can be known with certainty” (Haitjema, 2007, p. 2). 
